Investigating a $10.8 Million Inheritance Scam
In August, I received a letter from someone calling himself Howard Gilb, supposedly a lawyer in Ontario, Canada, explaining that a deceased client had left exactly $10,800,020 in an unclaimed account. The letter's proposal was that 10% would go to charity and we'd split the remaining 90% between us. The envelope had a Houston postmark and no return address, which didn't exactly add to its credibility. Something felt fishy.
I spend a lot of time thinking about Internet security and digital scams and fraud, but I'm very naive about scams that arrive in physical mail, and this was one I had not seen before. It seemed far too good to be true, but what concerned me was that someone else might fall for it. I also wondered whether particular people, or perhaps even people in my neighborhood, were being targeted.
So I decided to do a little investigating, with a bit of help from Codex organizing things and assisting me.
I preserved the original letter, made verified digital copies, and started looking into the supposed law firm and its Internet presence. The website had some clear problems, including the phrase "an Toronto's lawyer" and leftover references to "Safi Law Group", an apparently unrelated firm. None of that established who or what had put the site together, but it certainly didn't improve my confidence in the already too-good-to-be-true story.
What surprised me more was finding a Better Business Bureau warning describing similar letters sent across North America, sometimes using different names but promising that same oddly specific $10,800,020, complete with the charitable arrangement. The BBB had received nearly 100 complaints from 30 states and a Canadian province in less than a week. The FTC had also warned about this general sort of inheritance scam years earlier. Apparently this was a lot more familiar to fraud investigators than it was to me.
I wanted to preserve what I'd found and see whether the associated websites changed, so I used Codex to help build a small monitoring system. We kept the checks deliberately narrow, ran them from isolated GitHub-hosted machines rather than from my home network, and recorded what each observation could prove. (There were some interesting technical wrinkles in making sure the collector would stop rather than keep poking at potentially hostile infrastructure when something unexpected happened.)
I also submitted a mail-fraud report to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service in late August.
By late September, one of the monitored domains had stopped resolving to an Internet address, and a separate observation showed an account-suspension page for another domain. Ha, they did something their host didn't like. I couldn't tell what had caused either change, much less whether anyone had intervened.
In October, I decided to retire the recurring monitoring because I wasn't sure there was enough left to learn to justify continuing with it. A few days later, USPIS emailed to confirm that my complaint had been entered into its national Fraud Complaint System, so there's that.
I still have the original letter, the preserved evidence, and the monitoring code if something new gives me a reason to revisit the case.